SAFETY 1st

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Welcome to Issue 29 of NATA's Safety 1st *Flitebag*, our quarterly online safety newsletter, supporting the NATA Safety 1st Management System (SMS) for Air Operators.

This quarterly newsletter highlights known and emerging trends, environmental and geographical matters, as well as advances in operational efficiency and safety. Flight and ground safety have been enhanced and many accidents prevented because of shared experiences.

How Second-Guessing ATC Can Save Your Life

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"N1234, taxi to the ramp and call the tower immediately at 555-5555." The proverbial "call the tower" command is standard lore among pilots, prompting visions of remedial "709" rides or certificate suspension. How often are the tables turned and a pilot has reason to ask the tower how they can be reached for a "chat"?

As pilots and passengers, we trust ATC to help keep us safe. The Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) says the role of a control tower is to "provide for a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of traffic on and in the vicinity of an airport. When the responsibility has been so delegated, towers also provide for the separation of IFR aircraft in the terminal areas." The vast majority of time, the professionals who staff our air traffic control centers and towers do exactly that: help air traffic to move safely and efficiently. But sometimes, something goes wrong. A controller is distracted, has dozed off, or maybe meandered out for a cigarette and cell phone break. (That last example is purely hypothetical of course. That would never happen.) As a pilot, it's critical to maintain your own situational awareness and be prepared to second-guess an ATC command that could put you at risk. Here are two examples of ATC errors that could have led to disaster:

June 19, 2011 – Near Mid-Air Over Gulfport-Biloxi Airport

The details of this incident are extracted from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident docket.

The NTSB recently cited an operational error by a tower air traffic controller as the probable cause of a near mid-air collision involving a commercial jetliner and a small private plane over the Gulfport-Biloxi airport. The Embraer 145, operated as ExpressJet flight 2555 (dba Continental/United Express) was carrying 50 passengers and 3 crewmembers, and was bound for Houston Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH) where it landed uneventfully.

In This Issue:

On Sunday, June 19, 2011, at 12:35 p.m. CDT at Gulfport-Biloxi International Airport, a Cessna 172 was cleared for takeoff on runway 18 by the tower air traffic controller. Sixteen seconds later, the same air traffic controller cleared an Embraer 145, a commercial passenger flight, for takeoff on runway 14, the flight path of which intersects the flight path of runway 18.

While both airplanes were about 300 feet above the airfield, the Embraer passed in front of the Cessna. The closest proximity between the two planes was estimated to be 0 feet vertically and 300 feet laterally.

Investigation into the near-miss showed the incident controller was assigned the Local Controller position as well as Ground Control, Clearance Delivery/Flight Data and Controller-In-Charge positions. The investigation revealed the incident controller has a history of professional deficiencies that includes taking shortcuts with phraseology and not complying with standard checklist procedures. The incident controller also has a history of discipline problems that include absence without leave. (Frankly, the controller's disciplinary record is terrifying but the details are not relevant to this discussion.)

The Embraer captain saw a Cessna about 100 feet higher than the ERJ145 maneuvering left. The ERJ145 traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) did not issue an alert throughout the event. Even though there was no TCAS alert and the captain did not feel an evasive maneuver was required, the captain said to the first officer, "Wow, that was close." The tower controller gave the ERJ145 a right turn and the captain asked the tower twice if that Cessna was a go-around. The tower responded, "Yes, sir" to the second query that the Cessna was a go-around.

According to the Embraer first officer (FO) everything related to the flight thus far was standard and progressed normally as the ERJ145 reached the end of the runway. The FO heard the tower clear a Cessna for takeoff from runway 18, after which the FO called the tower for takeoff clearance. The FO did not expect to receive an immediate takeoff clearance since the tower had just cleared another aircraft for takeoff. The FO was surprised when the tower issued a takeoff clearance for the ERJ145 on runway 14. At the time it did not register to the FO that this could be a potential conflict. The ERJ145 taxied onto the runway, and departed. The tower gave the ERJ145 a right hand turn and a climb, and told them to contact departure. The FO told the captain that he didn't think it was a go-around, and that he thought he had heard the tower clear the Cessna for takeoff. The FO and pilot agreed that the tower probably made a mistake.

No one in either airplane was injured in the incident.

December 1, 2011 – Runway Incursion Between Southwest Airlines and Learjet

On December 1, 2011, Southwest 844 landed at Chicago's Midway Airport. The following are excerpts from ATC recordings.

The tower controller instructs the Southwest aircraft to "cross runway 31R and contact ground."

One of the Southwest pilots repeated the instructions, and then said, “We just had a plane take off 31R you cleared us to cross.” ATC repeated the instruction to cross 31R.

The pilot tried again, “Ok, just copy you cleared us on to a runway there was a plane taking off.” Then later, “You got a number to call you?”

ATC: “Yes, we do. Contact ground.”

“I want you to acknowledge you cleared us onto a runway when a plane was taking off,” the Southwest pilot said to the tower controller.

The controller responded by repeating the instructions again, “Cross runway 31R and contact ground.”

Once on the ground frequency, the pilot tells that controller of the incident. The ground controller asks if this discussion is sufficient to close the issue. The Southwest pilot responds that no, he would like a number to contact tower and will be filing a report.

This pilot gets the “Cool Cucumber” award. I don’t expect the controller to claim responsibility immediately and beg forgiveness over the radio (while being recorded, thereby ensuring an investigation and his own certain disciplinary action) for potentially causing the deaths of dozens of people. However, this controller sounds downright bored in his replies to the pilot. I’m afraid I would not have been as smooth on the radio as this Southwest pilot was.

According to the NTSB, "Air traffic control did not cancel the takeoff clearance of the [Learjet] nor direct the [Southwest plane] to hold short of Runway 31R." As the Southwest jet approached the intersection, its crew spotted the Lear on its departure roll. The Southwest crew “got on the brakes” and "the thing went right over our head." The NTSB calculated separation at 287 feet with the Lear passing 62 feet overhead.

The Federal Aviation Administration said the incident was classified as “Category C,’’ a less critical classification than a “Category A’’ near-miss. The agency has declined to say what action, if any, was taken with the controller involved. The NTSB is still investigating with Southwest’s full cooperation.

The role of ATC is to provide the safe, orderly flow of traffic at the airport. However, it doesn’t relieve the pilot of his or her responsibility to “see and avoid” when conditions permit; situational awareness is critical. Blind trust in ATC can be deadly.

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AIR CHARTER SAFETY FOUNDATION

ACSF ASAP Program Goes Live

The Air Charter Safety Foundation (ACSF) has officially gone live with its aviation safety action program (ASAP) for on-demand charter operators. The demonstration program currently has two charter operators under the jurisdiction of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Minneapolis Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), and will eventually expand to other charter operators in the FAA Great Lakes Region.

"We're very excited about the potential of this program to reduce risk and improve the safety culture in our industry," said ACSF Chairman Dennis Keith. "Operators and fractional managers will be able to participate at a greatly reduced cost, and the safety data they receive will be a significant benefit to their overall Safety Management System."

An ASAP is a reporting program that allows employees of participating air carriers, fractional managers and repair station certificate holders to identify and report safety issues to management and to the FAA for resolution, without fear that the FAA will use reports accepted under the program to take legal enforcement action against them, or that companies will use such information to take disciplinary action. Through such reporting, all participants have access to valuable safety information that might not otherwise be obtainable.

The objective of the ACSF ASAP program is to expand to other FAA regions and to encourage charter operators and fractional managers that lack the internal resources to establish their own ASAP program to participate through the ACSF and benefit from this valuable safety tool.

EJM, Keystone Aviation, M&N Aviation, and Priester Aviation Renew ACSF Industry Audit Standard Registration

The Air Charter Safety Foundation (ACSF) is pleased to announce that Executive Jet Management (EJM) of Cincinnati, OH; Keystone Aviation of Salt Lake City, UT; M&N Aviation of Casper, WY; and Priester Aviation, Wheeling, IL, have renewed their status on the ACSF Industry Audit Standard (IAS) Registry.

"By renewing their status on the IAS Registry, they have demonstrated their commitment to high standards," said ACSF President Bryan Burns. "We congratulate them on their continued dedication."

"M & N Aviation is proud to be a part of the Air Charter Safety Foundation team," said Marc Stirton, M & N Aviation director of safety. "The recent audit by ACSF helped improve our practices and safety culture as we continue to pursue the safest operation possible."

"Keystone Aviation is proud to be a part of the Air Charter Safety Foundation team," said Bill Haberstock, president and CEO. "The recent audit by ACSF helped improve our practices and safety culture as we continue to pursue the safest operation possible."

The IAS is the first and only extensive audit program specifically created for on-demand operators by a committee of Part 135 and 91K industry leaders. It is conducted every 24 months and is in-depth in its evaluation of regulatory compliance and the operator's SMS program against both FAA and international standards.

"Priester Aviation recognizes the incredible importance of providing the highest level of aviation safety, and commends our team for a successful ACSF renewal," said Andy Priester, president and COO. "We have built our corporate culture around continuous improvement of our safety systems and utilize the ACSF audit as a benchmark that we strive to elevate each time our company is evaluated."

Customers should look for the ACSF IAS registered logo and encourage their preferred charter provider to participate in the program. The ACSF makes its operator registry and key company details available at no charge, so verification of IAS registration is quick and easy. Charter consumers can view the registry by clicking here. Supporting materials are available by clicking here. Operators wishing to initiate the audit process should contact Russ Lawton at 1-888-SAFE-135 (888-723-3135).

ACSF Recommends Review of Stabilized Approach Criteria

The Air Charter Safety Foundation (ACSF) monitors accidents and incidents involving business aviation aircraft. On June 18, 2012, a turbo-jet aircraft went off the end of the runway after landing at the Dekalb-Peachtree Airport, near Atlanta, Georgia. The ACSF looks forward to the accident's investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board, which will determine the probable cause of this event.

As a precautionary measure, the ACSF recommends that all operators have their flight crews review Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular 91-79, *Runway Overrun Prevention*, which addresses landing performance and stabilized approaches along with other available resources, such as operator procedures for stabilized approaches. The advisory circular is available by clicking here.

ACSF Announces New Vice Chairman

The Air Charter Safety Foundation (ACSF) is pleased to announce the selection of Jeff Baum, president and CEO of Wisconsin Aviation as the new vice-chairman of the ACSF. He succeeds Bill Haberstock, president of Keystone Aviation, whose term expired June 30, 2012.

Mr. Baum is a founding member of the ACSF, and has served on the ACSF Executive Committee and Board of Governors since the foundation's inception.

"Jeff has been an invaluable member of the ACSF Executive Committee, and I'm delighted to have him as the new vice chairman," said ACSF President Bryan Burns. "With his knowledge and experience as President and CEO of Wisconsin Aviation and a leader in the aviation industry, he will help support and sustain the foundation's ongoing and future activities."

Mr. Baum has more than 16, 000 flight hours, holds both airline transport pilot and flight instructor certificates, and is an FAA-designated check airman.

Mr. Baum currently serves on the board of directors of the Wisconsin Aviation Trades Association (WATA), Wisconsin Business Aircraft Association, and the Transportation Development Association. He previously served on the board of the National Air Transportation Association, the National Learn to Fly Promotional Team, Inc., and the Governors Airport Financing Committee. Mr. Baum was twice named "Business Person of the Year" by the WATA and "Aviation Person of the Year" by the Wisconsin Airport Managers Association.

INDUSTRY NEWS

NATA Selects New President

The National Air Transportation Association (NATA) Board of Directors is pleased to announce the selection of Thomas L. Hendricks as the association's new president. He succeeds James K. Coyne, who has served as NATA's president since 1994. Hendricks will start his duties on September 1, 2012.

Hendricks most recently served as the senior vice president, safety, security and operations for Airlines for America, where he was responsible for all core airline technical and operational functions. He was also responsible for developing and shaping advocacy and policy positions on flight operations, safety, engineering, air traffic management and security.

"I am pleased to be joining NATA at such a critical time in aviation," said Hendricks. "Aviation drives our global economy, and I understand well the issues and opportunities we face. I look forward to working with NATA members and other stakeholder groups to continue improving an environment that puts safety first and enables general aviation to play a critical role in delivering service, creating jobs and facilitating commercial growth."

"We are proud to add Tom Hendricks to our team and to have him lead NATA," said Jim Sweeney, NATA chairman. "Tom brings a wealth of aviation experience and knowledge to the National Air Transportation Association. His experience and success with driving policy and advocacy programs will bring the visibility that NATA needs to grow and to continue to be a strong influence in the aviation industry."

"I am pleased that the board has chosen someone of Tom's caliber to take the reins at NATA. I look forward to working with him as he transitions into his new role," Coyne said.

Hendricks previously worked with Delta Air Lines as director of line operations and a chief pilot for flight operations in Atlanta, Georgia. During that time, Hendricks represented Delta on several key industry groups. Hendricks has also testified frequently before U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives subcommittees on safety, security and aviation operations.

A retired Air Force Reserve colonel and career fighter pilot, Hendricks served on active duty as a United States Navy officer on the USS Midway (CV-41) and as an instructor pilot at the United States Navy Fighter Weapons School. A native of Fairfield, Ohio, Hendricks graduated from The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina, with a Bachelor of Arts in Mathematics with secondary emphasis in Business Administration.

FAA Proposes Major Changes to Repair Station Rules, Extends Comment Period

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) titled Repair Stations that proposes significant changes to Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulation, Part 145, the rules governing all certificated repair stations.

Why It's Important

If finalized, this NPRM would make changes to repair station certification requirements and the system of repair station ratings and changes affecting repair stations providing maintenance to air carriers.

Major Provisions

The following chart depicts the proposed changes to repair station ratings.

Current Rating	New Proposed Rating
AirframeClass 1. Composite small 2. Composite large 3. All-metal small 4. All-metal large	Airframe Category 1. Aircraft certificated under Part 23 or 27 2. Aircraft certificated under Part 25 or 29 3. All other aircraft
Powerplant Class 1. Reciprocating engines, 400HP or less 2. Reciprocating engines, more than 400HP 3. Turbine engines	Powerplant Category 1. Reciprocating engines 2. Turbine engines 3. Auxiliary power units 4. All other powerplants
Propeller Class 1. All fixed and ground adjustable 2. All other propellers	Propeller Category 1. Fixed-pitch 2. Variable-pitch 3. All other propellers
Radio Class	Component
Instrument Class	Component
Accessory Class	Component

Limited Rating Specialized Service	Specialized Service
Limited Ratings (§ 145.61(b) lists 12 possible limited ratings)	Eliminated

In addition to the overhaul of repair station ratings, the proposed rule makes significant changes, generally aimed at clarifying existing language, to repair station certification requirements and the rules affecting repair stations performing maintenance for certificated air carriers.

The proposed changes would require all certificated repair stations to submit an application for certification under the new rules. The FAA proposes a 24-month "transition" period in which certificated repair station could continue to operate under the existing rules while preparing and waiting for the FAA to approve their application for certification under the new rules.

NATA Position

This NPRM contains rule changes that will affect the way repair stations are certificated and operate. The requirement for all repair stations to resubmit an application for certification during a 24-month "transition" period poses the potential for significant issues for existing repair stations.

NATA will be working closely with its members and the NATA Aircraft Maintenance and Systems Technology Committee to develop a full understanding of the impact of these proposed rule changes and to develop formal comments to the FAA.

Status

The NPRM is available for review here and is open for public comment through November 19, 2012.

BE AWARE OF FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS DURING CAMPAIGN SEASON

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will be issuing Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFR's) in support of travel of elected officials and candidates through the next several months. These restrictions are designed to provide a safe and secure environment for the event.

Pursuant to 49 USC 40103(b), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) classifies the airspace defined in this advisory and the published NOTAM as 'National Defense Airspace'. Pilots who do not adhere to the following procedures may be intercepted, detained and interviewed by law enforcement/security personnel. Any of the following additional actions

may also be taken against a pilot who does not comply with the requirements or any special instructions or procedures announced in the NOTAM:

a. The FAA may take administrative action, including imposing civil penalties and the suspension or revocation of airmen certificates; or

b. The United States Government may pursue criminal charges, including charges under Title 49 of the United States Code, Section 46307; or

c. The United States Government may use deadly force against the airborne aircraft, if it is determined that the aircraft poses an imminent security threat.

Be advised that noncompliance with the published NOTAM may result in the use of force.

Be sure to review all NOTAMs applicable to your operation prior to flights.

FAA Steps Up Enforcement of Laser Penalties

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has directed its investigators and staff to pursue stiffer penalties for individuals who purposefully point laser devices at aircraft.

"Shining a laser at an airplane is not a laughing matter. It's dangerous for both pilots and passengers, and we will not tolerate it," said U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. "We will pursue the toughest penalties against anyone caught putting the safety of the flying public at risk."

The number of reported laser incidents nationwide rose from 2,836 in 2010, to 3,592 in 2011. Laser incident reports have increased steadily since the FAA created a formal reporting system in 2005 to collect information from pilots.

The FAA supports the Department of Justice in its efforts to seek stern punishment for anyone who intentionally points a laser device into the cockpit of an aircraft.

"We will continue to fine people who do this, and we applaud our colleagues at the Justice Department who have aggressively prosecuted laser incidents under a new law that makes this a specific federal crime," said FAA Acting Administrator Michael Huerta.

The FAA has initiated enforcement action against 28 people charged with aiming a laser device at an aircraft since June 2011, and this week the agency directed FAA investigators and attorneys to pursue the stiffest possible sanctions for deliberate violations. The FAA has opened investigations in dozens of additional cases.

The FAA announced last June it would begin to impose civil penalties against individuals who point a laser device at an aircraft. The maximum penalty for one laser strike is $11,000, and the FAA has proposed civil penalties against individuals for multiple laser incidents, with $30,800 the highest penalty proposed to date. In many of these cases, pilots have reported temporary blindness or had to take evasive measures to avoid the intense laser light.

The guidance for FAA investigators and attorneys indicates laser violations should not be addressed through warning notices or counseling. It also directs moderately high civil penalties for inadvertent violations, but maximum penalties for deliberate violations. Violators who are pilots or mechanics face revocation of their FAA certificates, as well as civil penalties.
Local, state and federal prosecutors also have sentenced laser violators to jail time, community service, probation and additional financial penalties for court costs and restitution.

Broadcast quality audio and video from Secretary Ray LaHood are available for download at:
https://dotmediacenter.onehub.com/d/p52a/ (audio) and https://dotmediacenter.onehub.com/d/3git/ (video).

Broadcast quality audio from Acting FAA Administrator Michael Huerta is available for download at: https://dotmediacenter.onehub.com/d/tjyq/.

FAA Suspends Same Runway/Opposite Direction Operations

Following a recent incident at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) in which required minimum separation between three aircraft was lost due to controller miscommunications during same runway/opposite direction operations, the FAA has issued an Order temporarily suspending all such operations at airport certificated under Part 139.

A memo from FAA Chief Operating Officer, David Grizzle to Acting Administrator Huerta states, "Procedures for opposite direction arrivals and departures are not standard[ized]. We expect to have these detailed procedures in place across the system within a month."

Click here to read the full Order.

Advisory Circular Addresses Stall and Stick Pusher Training

AC 120-109, published by the FAA in early August, provides guidance for the training and testing of pilots for unexpected activations of stall warnings and stick pushers. Prior to practicing the maneuver, pilots should have a full

understanding of the factors that contribute to a stall as well as the stall warnings that occur in the specific airplane used for training. While performing the maneuver, the advisory circular suggests recovering from a stall at the first indication by reducing the angle of attack or according to the aircraft manufacturer.

The advisory circular recommends that training in stick pusher-equipped aircraft be completed in a flight simulation training device. Training should continue until the pilot's recognition and response time to the stick pusher activation is within acceptable limits.

FAA Announces Plans for Industry Working Group to Study Portable Electronics Usage

Given the widespread consumer use of portable electronic devices (PEDs), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is forming a government-industry group to study the current PED policies and procedures aircraft operators use to determine when these devices can be used safely during flight. Current FAA regulations require an aircraft operator to determine that radio frequency interference from PEDs are not a flight safety risk before the operator authorizes them for use during certain phases of flight.

"With so many different types of devices available, we recognize that this is an issue of consumer interest," said Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. "Safety is our highest priority, and we must set appropriate standards as we help the industry consider when passengers can use the latest technologies safely during a flight."

The government-industry group will examine a variety of issues, including the testing methods aircraft operators use to determine which new technologies passengers can safely use aboard aircraft and when they can use them. The group will also look at the establishment of technological standards associated with the use of PEDs during any phase of flight. The group will then present its recommendations to the FAA. The group will not consider the airborne use of cell phones for voice communications during flight.

"We're looking for information to help air carriers and operators decide if they can allow more widespread use of electronic devices in today's aircraft," said Acting FAA Administrator Michael Huerta. "We also want solid safety data to make sure tomorrow's aircraft designs are protected from interference."

The government–industry group, established through an Aviation Rulemaking Committee, will be formally established this fall and will meet for six months. It will include representatives from the mobile technology and aviation manufacturing industries, pilot and flight attendant groups, airlines, and passenger associations.

As the first step in gathering information for the working group, the FAA is seeking public input on the agency's current PED policies, guidance and procedures for operators. The Request for Comments, which will appear in the Federal Register on August 28th, is part of a data-driven agency initiative to review the methods and criteria operators use to permit PEDs during flights.

The FAA is seeking comments in the following areas:

- Operational, safety and security challenges associated with expanding PED use.
- Data sharing between aircraft operators and manufacturers to facilitate authorization of PED use.
- Necessity of new certification regulations requiring new aircraft designs to tolerate PED emissions.
- Information-sharing for manufacturers who already have proven PED and aircraft system compatibility to provide information to operators for new and modified aircraft.
- Development of consumer electronics industry standards for aircraft-friendly PEDs, or aircraft-compatible modes of operation.
- Required publication of aircraft operators' PED policies.
- Restriction of PED use during takeoff, approach, landing and abnormal conditions to avoid distracting passengers during safety briefings and prevent possible injury to passengers.
- Development of standards for systems that actively detect potentially hazardous PED emissions.
- Technical challenges associated with further PED usage, and support from PED manufacturers to commercial aircraft operators.

The request for comments will go on display later this week at the Federal Register. Comments can be filed up to 60 days after the Federal Register publish date. View the document at: http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/media/PED_RFC_8-27-2012.pdf.

FAA Issues SAFO on SOPs

The FAA released a Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) pertinent to all Part 135 and 91k operators. The SAFO emphasizes the use of Standard Operating Procedures during all phases of flight; both normal and emergency. The document references a 2008 crash involving a Hawker 800 during a go-around attempt that killed two pilots and six passengers. An investigation suggested that the pilots deviated from SOPs following an aborted landing.

The SAFO not only recommends the use of SOPs by flight crews during all phases of flight, but calls on the certificate holders to establish a culture that promotes SOPs. The FAA recommends Advisory Circular (AC) 120-71A to develop, implement and update SOPs.

IN CASE YOU MISSED IT: FLTPLAN.COM CAN HELP WITH MEXICAN OVERFLIGHT REGULATIONS

Mexico is now enforcing its overflight fees retroactively. Here's what you need to know if you've flown through Mexican airspace in the last ten years.

What makes Mexico's regulations unique from other countries are four things:

1. The regulations are published in Mexico's tax code, not in their Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) and therefore do not appear in any international aeronautical publications.
2. Airspace fees are calculated based on the wingspan of the aircraft and NOT on weight.
3. Mexico does not issue an invoice to advise pilots that they have incurred a fee. It is the pilot's responsibility to correctly determine the amount owed and to make payment per the regulations.
4. Airspace and over-time fees can only be paid via a Mexican bank.

Consequently, many pilots are unaware that they owe these fees and over time these fees accumulate interest and back charges which can grow into very significant amounts.

Who is affected? Pilots should be aware that if during the last 10 years they made a flight through Mexican airspace that neither took off nor landed in Mexico, they are subject to airspace fees. Flights that flew to, or from, an airport within Mexico, ARE NOT subject to these fees. Also, any pilot that used a Mexican airport outside of normal hours has incurred an ATC overtime fee which must be paid using the same procedures as airspace fees. Although these regulations have been in place for many years, they were not strictly enforced until December of 2011. As a result, many pilots trying to fly through Mexican airspace with unpaid fees are being denied entry by ATC.

What do I do? Understanding the frustration felt by pilots who find themselves in this situation, FltPlan.com has developed a plan to assist pilots in resolving this situation and to avoid it happening again. For a reasonable fee, we can do the legwork for you, so you have smooth flying.

Our Mexican Overflight Fee Payment Service can help you:

- ✈ Find out if you owe fees to the Mexican government and how much they are
- ✈ Distribute your payment to the Mexican authorities for flights already made, and sent you a receipt as proof of payment. (Keep in mind that the Mexican government requires that payment be made from a Mexican bank. Credit cards, checks and wire transfers from U.S. banks are not accepted.)
- ✈ Handle your payments for future trips

For prices and more information contact Support@FltPlan.com or Click Here.

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NTSB NEWS

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD · WASHINGTON D.C. 20594

DETERIORATED PARTS ALLOWED FLUTTER WHICH LED TO FATAL CRASH AT 2011 RENO AIR RACES

The National Transportation Safety Board determined recently that deteriorated locknut inserts found in the highly modified North American P-51D airplane that crashed during the 2011 National Championship Air Races in Reno, Nevada, allowed the trim tab attachment screws to become loose, and even initiated fatigue cracking in one screw. This condition, which resulted in reduced stiffness in the elevator trim system, ultimately led to aerodynamic flutter at racing speed that broke the trim tab linkages, resulting in a loss of controllability and the eventual crash.

On September 16, 2011, as the experimental single-seat P-51D airplane "The Galloping Ghost," traveling about 445 knots, or 512 mph, in the third lap of the six-lap race, passed pylon 8, it experienced a left-roll upset and high-G pitch up. During the upset sequence, the airplane's vertical acceleration peaked at 17.3 G, causing incapacitation of the pilot. Seconds later, a section of the left elevator trim tab separated in flight. The airplane descended and impacted the ramp in the spectator box seating area, killing the pilot and 10 spectators and injuring more than 60 others.

"In Reno, the fine line between observing risk and being impacted by the consequences when something goes wrong was crossed," said NTSB Chairman Deborah A. P. Hersman. "The pilots understood the risks they assumed; the spectators assumed their safety had been assessed and addressed."

Contributing to the accident were the undocumented and untested major modifications made to the airplane, as well as the pilot's operation of the airplane in the unique air racing environment without adequate flight testing.

The nearly 70-year-old airplane had undergone numerous undocumented modifications. The modifications, designed to increase speed, included shortening of the wings, installation of a boil-off cooling system for the engine, increasing the elevator counterweights, modification of the pitch trim system, and changing the incidence of the horizontal and vertical stabilizers.

Although the Federal Aviation Administration required that a flight standards district office be notified in writing of any major changes made to The Galloping Ghost before it could be flown, investigators could find no records that such

notifications were made except for the installation of the boil-off cooling system. The undocumented major modifications were identified through wreckage examinations, photographic evidence, and interviews with ground crewmembers.

In April, while the investigation was ongoing and after the NTSB's investigative hearing in January on air race and air show safety, the NTSB issued 10 safety recommendations to the Reno Air Racing Association, the National Air racing Group Unlimited Division, and the FAA. These recommendations addressed:

- requiring engineering evaluations for aircraft with major modifications;
- raising the level of safety for spectators and personnel near the race course;
- improving FAA guidance for air race and course design;
- providing race pilots with high-G training and evaluating the feasibility of G-suit requirements for race pilots; and
- tracking the resolution of race aircraft discrepancies identified during prerace technical inspections.

Although no additional safety recommendations were issued today, the Board reclassified nine existing recommendations as described below:

- Eligibility Requirements for Aircraft with Major Modifications - recommendations A 12 9 and A-12-13 classified "Open—Acceptable Response"
- Prerace Technical Inspection Discrepancy Tracking - recommendation A 12 10, classified "Closed—Acceptable Action"
- Spectator Safety - recommendations A 12 14 and 15, classified "Closed—Acceptable Action"
- High G Training, G-Suit Feasibility for Pilots - recommendations A 12 11, -12, -16, and -17, classified "Closed—Acceptable Action"

A tenth safety recommendation, issued to the FAA, which addressed air race and course design guidance was reclassified as "Open—Acceptable Response" on July 25, 2012.

"It's good news for the air races that so many of our recommendations have been addressed," said Chairman Hersman. "We will continue to push for the full implementation of all of our safety recommendations."

A synopsis of the NTSB report, including the probable cause and a complete list of the reclassified safety recommendations, is available at:http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2012/reno_nv/index.html.

Other information and previous press releases related to the Reno Air Races investigation:

- Reno Air Races Recommendations Issued Earlier this Year: http://www.ntsb.gov/news/2012/120410.html
- Air Race and Air Show Safety Hearing : http://www.ntsb.gov/news/2012/120105.html
- Investigation Update: http://www.ntsb.gov/news/2011/111021.html
- NTSB Opens Docket on Reno Air Races Crash http://www.ntsb.gov/news/2012/120821b.html



NTSB Hosts General Aviation Search and Rescue Forum

The National Transportation Safety Board held a forum focused on general aviation search and rescue operations on July 17 and 18, 2012. In the United States, following the crash of a general aviation airplane, inland searches for the aircraft are conducted by the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center, who are supported by numerous Federal, state, local, and volunteer organizations.

The forum concentrated on examining the regulations, policies, and procedures at a Federal level and serve as a platform to facilitate dialog between search organizations, technology manufacturers, and industry groups on the issues currently impacting the general aviation community. Additionally, the forum spent a second day discussing emerging technologies and how they may shape the future of general aviation search and rescue.

The two-day forum was chaired by NTSB Chairman Deborah A. P. Hersman and all five Board Members participated. Panelists participating in the forum represented government and industry.

"Search and rescue can often mean the difference between life and death," said Chairman Hersman. "Unfortunately, every year we see delays in the detection and location of crashed aircraft due to outdated equipment and a failure to coordinate information and assets."

The NTSB has issued more than two dozen safety recommendations on search and rescue, conducted safety studies addressing ways to improve search and rescue operations and even included general aviation safety on the Most Wanted List of transportation improvements.

NTSB public events are streamed live via webcast. Webcasts are archived for a period of three months from the time of the meeting.

Mechanical Defects and a Breakdown in Monitoring Procedures Caused Wintertime 757 Runway Excursion in Wyoming, NTSB Says

Mechanical defects that prevented the automatic deployment of speedbrakes, which assist in slowing the plane after landing, and the captain's failure to monitor and manually deploy them led to an overrun of a passenger jetliner off of a snowy runway in Wyoming. The incident was compounded by an anomaly with the thrust reversers.

On December 29, 2010, at about 11:38 a.m. MST, American Airlines flight 2253, a Boeing 757-200, ran off the departure end of runway 19 during light snow after landing at Wyoming's Jackson Hole Airport (JAC). The airplane came to rest about 730 feet past the departure end of the runway in deep snow. None of the 179 passengers and six crewmembers were injured; the airplane sustained minor damage. The flight originated from Chicago O'Hare Airport.

"Through this investigation, all of us — the investigator, manufacturer, operator, and pilots, alike — all learned important safety lessons," said NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman. "The recommendations we issue today will make valuable contributions to improving aviation safety."

The investigation found that the pilots, both of whom had flown into JAC on numerous occasions, were familiar with the challenging wintertime landing conditions there and had made thorough preparations for the approach and landing during what they described as an otherwise uneventful flight from Chicago.

The approach to the runway was normal and the airplane touched down about 600 feet beyond the approach threshold. The speedbrakes, which disrupt the airflow over the wings and greatly increase the wheel braking effectiveness, did not automatically deploy as designed. The CVR transcript showed that the captain, acting as the monitoring pilot, failed to identify the non-deployment and erroneously stated "deployed" shortly after touchdown. Immediately after this, the first officer, who was the pilot flying, tried to deploy the thrust reversers; when they did not initially deploy, the captain took over the thrust reverser controls and they deployed about 18 seconds after touchdown. Subsequently, the airplane continued off the departure end of the runway, coming to a stop in deep snow off the end of the paved surface.

American Airlines training and procedures require the pilot monitoring (in this case, the captain) to observe and call out the position of the speedbrake lever after landing; if the speedbrakes do not deploy automatically, the captain is to manually deploy them. Although the pilots could have manually deployed the speedbrakes at any time during the landing roll, neither pilot recognized that the speedbrakes had not automatically deployed because they were both trying to resolve the thrust reverser issue.

The landing performance analysis showed that under similar runway conditions, even without thrust reverser deployment, the airplane would have stopped about 4500 feet down the 6300-foot runway had the speedbrakes been promptly deployed.

The investigation revealed that the speedbrakes did not automatically deploy because of a latent assembly defect in one of the speedbrakes mechanisms. In addition, the NTSB determined that the thrust reversers did not initially deploy because of a rare mechanical/hydraulic interaction that occurred in the thrust reverser system as a result of an unloading event at the precise instant that the first officer commanded their deployment immediately after touchdown.

As a result of the investigation, the NTSB made the following new safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): require that all transport category air carriers develop and incorporate training to address recognition of a situation in which the speedbrakes do not deploy as expected after landing; require all newly type-certificated air transport category airplanes to have an aural, or otherwise unique, alert that warns pilots that the speedbrakes have not deployed during the landing roll; and require Boeing to establish guidance for pilots of all relevant airplanes to follow when an unintended thrust reverser lockout occurs and to provide that guidance to all operators of those airplanes.

The NTSB also reiterated to the FAA three safety recommendations related to multiple emergency situation flight training and monitoring skills and workload management that it had made during investigations of previous accidents.
A synopsis of the NTSB report, including the probable cause, findings, and a complete list of the safety recommendations, is available. The full report will be available on the website in several weeks.

NTSB Issues Safety Alert to Pilots on Limitations of In-Cockpit Weather Radar Displays

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recently issued a Safety Alert to warn pilots using in-cockpit FIS-B and Satellite Weather display systems that the NEXRAD "age indicator" can be misleading. The actual NEXRAD data can be as much as 20 minutes older than the age indication on the display in the cockpit. If misinterpreted, this difference in time can present potentially serious safety hazards to aircraft operating in the vicinity of fast-moving and quickly developing weather systems.

NEXRAD mosaic imagery depicts weather conditions from multiple ground radar sites. The NEXRAD "age-indicator" on the cockpit display indicates the time that the mosaic image was created, not the time of the actual weather conditions. The NEXRAD image is always older than the actual weather conditions.

The NTSB has cited two fatal weather-related aircraft accidents in which NEXRAD images were displayed to the pilot that were presented as one-minute old on the age-indicator, but contained information that was up to five to eight minutes behind the real-time conditions.

In addition to raising pilot awareness on this issue, the Safety Alert also reminds pilots of the importance of obtaining a thorough preflight weather briefing.

The Safety Alert is available at http://go.usa.gov/v0Z.

Information for Operators (InFO)

Each issue of the *NATA Safety 1st Flitebag* includes a review of the latest InFOs. If you have not read previous issues, please review all InFOs by clicking here.

An InFO contains valuable information for operators that should help them meet certain administrative, regulator or operational requirements with relatively low urgency or impact on safety. InFOs contain information or a combination of information and recommended action to be taken by the respective operators identified in each individual InFO.

Number	Title
12014 (PDF)	"Climb Via" Phraseology for the Assignment of Route Transitions and/or Standard Instrument Departure (SID) and Area Navigation (RNAV) SID Procedures
12013 (PDF)	Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2012-11-09 on Lavatory Oxygen Installation
12012 (PDF)	Use of Passenger-Provided Seat Belt Extenders
12011 (PDF)	Engineered Materials Arresting System (EMAS)
12010 (PDF)	Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II) Version 7.1.
12009 (PDF)	Magnetic Variation Differences Between Ground-Based Navigational Aid (NAVAID) Instrument Flight Procedures (IFP), Area Navigation (RNAV) IFPs, and RNAV Systems

Safety Alert for Operators (SAFOs)

Each issue of the *NATA Safety 1st Flitebag* includes a review of the latest SAFOs. If you have not read previous issues, please review all SAFOs by clicking here.

What is a SAFO?

A SAFO contains important safety information and may include recommended action. SAFO content should be especially valuable to air carriers in meeting their statutory duty to provide service with the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest.

Number	Title
12004 (PDF)	Damage to Airbus A-330 Series Aircraft-Structure Due to Cargo Door "Slamming" Action
12003 (PDF)	Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 135 Certificate Holders and Part 91K Program Managers

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The National Air Transportation Association (NATA), The Voice of Aviation Business, is committed to raising the standard on air safety and implemented additional guidance through NATA's Safety 1st Management System (SMS) for Air Operators. The Flitebag provides continuing education in support of the SMS program.

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